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ABSTRACT
Research on jihadist online propaganda (JOP) tends to focus on the
production, content, and dissemination of jihadist online messages.
Correspondingly, the target of JOP—that is, the audience—has thus
far attracted little scholarly attention. This article seeks to redress this
neglect by focusing on how audiences respond to jihadist online
messaging. It presents the ﬁndings of an online pilot survey testing
audience responses to clips from English-language Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria videos. The survey was beset at every stage by ethical, legal,
and practical restrictions, and we discuss how these compromised our
results and what this means for those attempting to do research in this
highly sensitive area.
Researching Jihadist Online Propaganda (JOP)
Broadly speaking, JOP raises three core questions: (1) what is it or what forms does it take?;
(2) what is its causal role in the radicalization process of jihadists?; and (3) how is it received
by the audiences it is intended to shake up, berate, or terrorize? Thus far, scholarship in ter-
rorism studies has made great progress in answering the ﬁrst question, but has made strik-
ingly little headway in probing the second and third. It is not difﬁcult to understand why.
Assuming they have the requisite know-how in locating it, JOP is readily accessible to the
researcher. By contrast, the radicalization process of jihadists is not immediately accessible
to the researcher and the question of what role (if any) exposure to JOP plays in it raises
some formidable methodological problems. (It also involves leaving one’s study, a prospect
that no doubt terriﬁes some scholars of terrorism.1)
It is worth brieﬂy considering what these problems are. The ﬁrst and most serious one is
of access: of ﬁnding a decent sample of active jihadists with whom one could interview about
their exposure to JOP. As research by Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam has
demonstrated, it is not impossible to make contact with jihadists and interview them via
online messaging apps.2 But it probably is not feasible for most scholars to conduct the kind
of in-depth, face-to-face qualitative life-history interviews that would facilitate introspection
and illuminate their radicalization pathways, given the physical risks involved.
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The second problem is intellectual in nature: even if one were to conduct life-history
interviews with a decent sample of active jihadists, it is far from certain that speaking to
them about their pathways to becoming jihadists would settle the question of how JOP fea-
tured as a causal component. This is because there is every reason to expect that they simply
would not know how it featured among all the other myriad experiences, events, and choices
that shaped their radicalization.3
An alternative approach would be to interview ex-jihadists, who present no obvious secu-
rity risk to the researcher. But this is far from ideal, given not only the difﬁculties of assem-
bling a decent sample of interviewees, but also the inherent methodological problems
associated with retrospective account-making, and the way in which time skews memory
and perception. This is not to say that interviews with ex-jihadists or ex-terrorists of any
stripe are not worthwhile—far from it—but that the methodological problems of interview-
ing ex-terrorists are especially acute because of the enormous pressures on them to rational-
ize or excuse, rather than to reliably explain, their involvement in terrorism.4 For example,
in the accounts of some former Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members, this takes the
form of a Goffmanesque “sad tale,”5 in which the teller presents himself as the innocent vic-
tim of “brainwashing.”6 Hence, in Sykes and Matza’s terminology, they are more “more
sinned against than sinning.”7
A second alternative approach would be to interview would-be jihadists or those who are
sympathetic to jihadist groups but are not yet fully convinced of the cause. The main advan-
tage of this approach is that it would shed light not just on how culturally immersed they are
in JOP, but also on how they actually consume and relate to it.
There is compelling evidence to suggest that active jihadists are deeply immersed in the
culture of jihadism, and jihadist videos form a central element of that culture.8 A recent
report by Policy Exchange, a U.K. think tank, claimed that “over two-thirds (69%) of Islam-
ist-related terrorism offences in the UK [between 1998 and 2015] have been committed by
individuals who were known to have in some way consumed extremist and/or ‘instructional’
terrorist material.”9 Now, if would-be jihadists were only lightly exposed to JOP, it might
suggest that the role of this propaganda was not particularly salient in the radicalization pro-
cess, and that, as some scholars have theorized, JOP acquires a causal salience only after
jihadists have become radicalized as a reinforcement tool. But even if this were not the case,
and they were actively consuming JOP before becoming fully radicalized, it would still be dif-
ﬁcult to empirically demonstrate and measure its role in bridging the gap between sympathy
and actual involvement in jihadist activity.
The main disadvantage of this approach, however, is its feasibility. The problems, roughly,
are twofold: ﬁrst, it is not at all clear how one would assemble a sample of would-be jihadists
or those who are sympathetic with jihadist causes. Perhaps some researchers would be “in
the know,” so to speak, in some communities, but most would not be, and even for research-
ers who possess the relevant knowledge, it is not clear how they would select and recruit
individuals to their sample of would-be jihadists. Second, it is also unclear how researchers
would manage the highly ﬂammable politics around the selection issue, given the potential
offense any approach may cause to those of Muslim background who already feel securitized
and subject to anti-Islamic bigotry. In addition to this, there would also be the very real risk
of interference from law enforcement agencies, who may request to see any data gathered
under terrorism laws.10 Potential interviewees would also be sensitive to this possibility,11
and hence it is highly unlikely that they would participate in a research study that not only
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implied they were “vulnerable” to terrorism, but also put them at risk of arrest or interfer-
ence from the authorities.
Of the three core questions about JOP identiﬁed above, (3)—how is it received by the
audiences it is intended to shake up, berate or terrorize?—remains the most under-
researched in terrorism studies. Given that terrorism is a form of symbolic communication
targeted at audiences,12 one would expect to see a keener engagement among terrorism stud-
ies scholars with the many and varied audiences of terrorist atrocities. There is of course an
impressive range of scholarship on terrorism as a form of signaling, where the focus is on
how competing terrorist groups escalate violence to project strength and primacy to both
their supporters and competitors in violence,13 but on the issue of how ordinary civilians
interpret and respond to terrorist atrocities and campaigns of violence there is little sustained
scholarship. This probably says more about the schedule of research priorities in terrorism
studies than about an attitude of incuriosity on the part of scholars toward the audience of
terrorism.14 In a ﬁeld where the primary focus is on terrorist organizations, the people who
belong to or support these organizations and the ideologies they subscribe to, the wider audi-
ence of terrorism will always remain somewhat of a marginal research concern. Yet (3) is the
more empirically tractable of the three questions, but it, too, raises some vexing problems,
which we discuss at length in this article.
The article is divided into three main sections. The ﬁrst sets our research into a broader
scholarly context. The second describes the Islamic State Audience Reception (ISAR) Survey,
and details the numerous challenges—ethical, legal, and practical—we faced in carrying it
out. And the third presents the results of the survey and a discussion of key ﬁndings. We
conclude by addressing the limitations of our study, and outline the challenges and possibili-
ties for further research in this area.
Contextualizing ISIS Online Propaganda
The Scholarly Consensus
In February 2015, three teenage schoolgirls from east London absconded to Syria and van-
ished into the block caps of international headline news.15 According to a report in the Daily
Mail the girls—Shamima Begum, Kadiza Sultana, and Amira Abase—had been “ruthlessly
groomed online” and were “brainwashed in their bedrooms.”16 By way of substantiation, the
report noted that both Begum and Sultana were proliﬁc Twitter users and that Begum had
followed scores of pro-ISIS accounts, giving her “access to a torrent of appalling images and
footage.” It also quoted Begum’s sister as saying that ISIS is “preying on young innocent girls
and it’s not right.”
Despite the haziness of the details about the girls’ motives and how they became radical-
ized, the story of their defection to ISIS became generalized into a moral fable about the dan-
gers of violent Islamism, and how even the most innocent and precocious minds are
vulnerable to its deadly allure.17 In much of the media frenzy surrounding the case, the girls
resembled not so much active agents with personal convictions as the passive victims of
ideological indoctrination or mind-control.18 It was not that they had come to believe, after
a period of personal reﬂection and rumination, in what they saw as the virtues of Islamic the-
ocracy over the demerits of Western secular society; rather, it was that they had been cor-
rupted by “slick” propaganda, distributed by online “groomers.” A further plotline in this
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horror story of maligned youthful innocence was how powerful social media platforms, like
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, had aided and abetted the monster of violent Islamism by
disseminating its virtual pathogens.19
As the above suggests, popular discourse on ISIS tends to construct the group as a virtual heg-
emon with unparalleled powers of persuasion and intimidation, poisoning young minds and
terrifying older ones. Scholars, however, typically strike a more cautious note. Peter Neumann,
for example, is quoted as saying: “I don’t believe we’ve seen a single case of a ﬁghter who traveled
to Syria without knowing someone [in real life] who went there ﬁrst.”20 “The function of social-
media propaganda,” according to Neumann, is “to provide a growth medium for the germ [of
jihadist ideology] once it has been contracted. Then, on their own time and through easily acces-
sible sermons, articles, and videos, individuals can nurture and feed it.”21 This reﬂects a broader
consensus among scholars: namely, that while extremist online content is not in itself a sufﬁcient
cause of radicalization, it plays an important contributory causal role in the complex process by
which ordinary people become radicalized toward violence.22
Within this consensus, there is not a huge amount of clarity on just how important that
role is in relation to other aspects of the radicalization process.23 But on the nature of the
role of extremist online propaganda most scholars agree that sustained24 exposure to it helps
reinforce preexisting assumptions and beliefs that are already tending toward the extreme.25
For many scholars, the nature of this reinforcement is one of “normalization,” whereby
exposure to extreme material serves to validate a person’s already extreme views, so that
they no longer seem taboo or deviant.26 In addition to this, some scholars suggest that
extremist online material can serve to trigger the radicalization process by inducing a sense
of moral outrage in the person who comes across it.27
What this consensus has going for it is that it intuitively makes sense. It also avoids the
reductive, baseless, and slightly hysterical narrative of extremist online content as a principal
driver of jihadist radicalization and violence. Yet, just like the narrative it calls into question,
it lacks a ﬁrm empirical grounding. We still know all too little about how extremist online
propaganda is consumed and understood by those already radicalized or moving toward
radicalization, still less how its consumption shaped their thoughts, emotions, and, ulti-
mately, life-choices.28 As Anne Aly remarks, there is a “lack of empirical evidence to support
assumptions of causality between online narratives and radicalization to violent extrem-
ism.”29 Maura Conway similarly notes: “There is no yet proven connection between con-
sumption of and networking around violent extremist online content and adoption of
extremist ideology and/or engagement in violent extremism and terrorism.”30
As yet, there is no scholarly consensus on how terrorist atrocities are understood and
emotionally absorbed by the wider audiences at whom they are targeted because scholars
have barely begun to address the issue. As Aly makes clear: “Within the literature on terror-
ism and the Internet, the audience—those individuals who receive messages, make meaning
from them and then decide whether to act on them—is conspicuously missing.”31
ISIS Online Propaganda: What We Know and Do Not Know
There is a rapidly expanding body of research on the content and dissemination of ISIS
online messaging. One prominent study, for example, by J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan,
measured ISIS’s presence and demographic composition on Twitter.32 More recent studies
have charted the migration of ISIS propagandists from Twitter to the encrypted messaging
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service Telegram, now that the former has adopted a more vigilant policy toward suspending
pro-ISIS accounts.33 Many more studies have sought to code and describe the content of
ISIS’s varied online messages. One of the ﬁrst and most comprehensive of these was a report
by Charlie Winter, in which he identiﬁed six key themes in ISIS online messaging: mercy,
belonging, brutality, victimhood, war, and utopia.34 Of these, the most prominent, according
to Winter, was the last one—far more so than brutality,35 with which the group has become
synonymous in popular accounts. In a more recent study, Haroro J. Ingram provided a con-
tent-analysis of nine issues of Dabiq magazine, using this to illuminate “the strategic logic of
IS’s communications campaign targeting Western Muslims.”36 In another Cori E. Dauber
and Mark Robinson adopted a more qualitatively oriented approach, closely documenting
ISIS’s appropriation and use of what they call a “Hollywood visual style” in ofﬁcial ISIS vid-
eos.37 And in yet another Henrik Gra

trud conducted a thematic analysis of seventeen ISIS
nasheeds released between December 2013 and March 2015.38
Thanks to this body of research,39 we now have much better idea of what ISIS messaging
looks and sounds like, how it rhetorically works, what its dominant themes are, how much
of it there is and how it reaches its audiences. What we still do not know, however, is what
the various audiences on the receiving end make of it all. In what follows we describe a two-
year-long effort to redress this knowledge-deﬁcit.
The ISAR Survey
Well before launching the ISAR survey, our original research plan was to conduct an audience-
reception study of ISIS videos using a qualitative approach similar to that deployed in Tamar
Liebes and Elihu Katz’s seminal 1990 study of audience responses to the soap opera Dallas, titled
The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of “Dallas.” For that study, Liebes and Katz
would watch the show with groups of families and friends from Israel, Japan, and America, and
then initiate a conversation about it. Watching Dallas, they found, was “an active and involving
experience” that “varies with the cultural background one brings to the viewing.”40 “How in the
world is a program like Dallas so universally understandable, or is it?,” asked Liebes and Katz.41
“Is it understood in the same way in different places? Does it evoke different kinds of involve-
ment and response?”42 We wanted to ask a similar set of questions in relation to ISIS English-
speaking propaganda videos, and we were particularly concerned to explore how Muslim young
adults in the West—one of ISIS’s primary target audiences—responded to these videos, and
whether their responses differed from non-Muslim young adults. But after speaking with several
gate-keepers from the Muslim communities we wanted to reach, it soon became clear that such
a project was not fully feasible. In the current political climate in Britain, it has become difﬁcult
for many young Muslims to speak openly and publicly about ISIS for fear that what they say
may attract unwanted interest or interference from the authorities.43 According to U.K. terror-
ismlegislation,44 university lecturers (as well as teachers in schools and colleges) have a legal duty
to report to the authorities anyone who displays “signs of radicalization”45 in their classrooms or
on the campuses in which they work.46 If the Muslims we interviewed happened to support ISIS
or express positive views about the ISIS videos we wanted to show them, it would be highly
unlikely that they would tell us about this, and if they did we would be legally obliged to report
this to the authorities. We were also advised that any attempts on our part to recruit Muslims to
focus-groups on ISIS videos may be seen by them as stigmatizing by associating them with ISIS.
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Given these problems, we abandoned this plan, and instead decided on an anonymous
online survey on ISIS videos aimed at young adults, of all faith-backgrounds, in Britain and
North America. The idea behind the survey was simple: Ask ordinary young adults to watch
clips from ISIS videos—which we edited to exclude scenes of graphic violence—and then get
them to tell us about that viewing experience.
The ISAR survey was launched with its own dedicated Web-domain in September 2016
and remained online until the end of March 2017. To our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst audience
reception survey of ISIS videos anywhere.
Before taking the survey, respondents were asked to read a page of text describing the core
aim and rationale of the research, making it explicit that the survey (a) was being conducted
by researchers at the University of Kent; (b) that it was an anonymous research instrument
that did not require the disclosure of any personal information; (c) that it would take no
more than 15 minutes to complete; (d) that all responses would be automatically saved and
encrypted; (e) that the video footage used in the survey may cause distress or unease; (f) that
respondents could terminate their participation at any time by clicking on a “STOP THE
SURVEY NOW” bar attached to every page of the survey; and (g) that by clicking on the
“START” bar at the bottom of the page respondents would indicate their consent to partici-
pate in the survey. The second page of the survey gave a brief description of ISIS, using
sparse and neutral language.
The survey contained four embedded clips from four ofﬁcial, English-language ISIS vid-
eos: “The Clanging of the Swords part 4” (al-Furqan Media; released on 17 May 2014); “For
the Sake of Allah” (al-H ̣ayat Media Center; released on 14 April 2015); “Eid Greetings from
the Land Of Khilafah” (al-Ḥayat Media Center; released on 2 August 2014); and “Although
the Disbelievers Dislike it” (al-Furqan Media; released on 16 November 2014). All four vid-
eos were major releases for ISIS, and attracted considerable attention in the Western news
media.47 The individual clips were between 1–2 minutes long, and contain ISIS’s unmistak-
able digital imprimatur: they are technically assured, in High Deﬁnition, and scored with
ISIS’s signature nasheeds. Each speaks to a particular theme or number of themes, including
those of power, violence, vengeance, benevolence, Islamic rectitude, and warrior
“badassery.”48 The ﬁrst clip shows drone footage of a triumphant ISIS convoy in Fallujah;49
the second is taken from the middle section of a nasheed-driven video performed by the Ger-
man ISIS member and former rapper Denis Cuspert (AKA Deso Dogg);50 the third shows a
beatiﬁc scene from ISIS’s recently fallen de facto capital Raqqa, where a strong and attrac-
tive-looking bearded ISIS ﬁghter hands out toys to enthused young children; and the fourth
shows an international cast of knife-wielding ISIS recruits marching scores of Syrian Army
captives to a line-up where they are to be executed.51 (The clip stops just before the mass-
beheading ensues.) In addition to these four clips, the survey also included a 2-minute U.S.
government “countermessage” video in which former ISIS members speak out against the
injustices and inhumanity of ISIS rule.
Respondents were asked to play the clips and then prompted to select from a menu of
ﬁxed answers about their technical quality, thematic content, and veracity. They were also
asked, at different points in the survey, to: (1) rate their attitude toward ISIS; (2) indicate
whether or not they had seen an ISIS video before, and if so how they came to watch it and
how many they had watched; and (3) indicate whether or not they had seen a U.S. State
Department “countermessage” video, and if so, how they came to watch it and how many
they had watched. We also asked respondents a limited range of demographic questions.
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Ethical, Legal, and Other Restrictions
According to Maura Conway:
Direct audience research is problematic because of the nature of violent extremist and terrorist
online content, which presents problems for undertaking the kinds of experiments that are stan-
dard in other areas of Internet audience research as it would require introducing subjects to
online content with allegedly radicalizing effects and, in fact, almost certainly necessitate expos-
ing youth and young adults to distressing levels of violence. Progressing research in this area is
thus not easy; it is not impossible either however.52
We would broadly concur with this, and in what follows we outline the various restric-
tions we faced in carrying out the ISAR survey.
The ﬁrst restriction, which Conway alludes to above, had to do with the types of visual
material we could use in the survey. Had it been possible, we would have liked to subject
respondents to what Conway calls “distressing levels of violence,” given that so much of
ISIS’s video content aimed at English-speaking audiences is drenched in just such violence.53
But had we included this video content in the survey, it would never have passed ethical
review.
The second restriction was to do with legality, since in the United Kingdom, under sec-
tion 2 of the 2006 Terrorism Act, it is a crime to disseminate a “terrorist publication,” which
is deﬁned as “matter” that is likely to be understood by those who receive it “as a direct or
indirect encouragement… to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism,” or “to be useful in the commission or preparation of such acts.”54
The clips used in the ISAR survey were edited so as to exclude scenes of interpersonal vio-
lence, but two were saturated in the promise of violence, and one openly encouraged and
gloriﬁed jihadist attacks against civilians in Western cities. This greatly protracted the pro-
cess of ethical review, since before we were even allowed to submit an ethics application to
our school’s Research Ethics Advisory Group (REAG), the chair of the REAG stipulated that
we obtain a legal opinion on the survey. We agreed to this, but it took at least a month to
convince our school that it had a moral duty to cover the cost of the legal opinion.
Once we had received conﬁrmation from our school that it would cover the cost of the
legal opinion, we duly enlisted the services of Christopher Henley Q.C., who in the opening
remarks of his opinion put the matter like this:
I am instructed to provide a written advice on the lawfulness of what is proposed.… To put it
bluntly might those responsible for this survey be putting themselves at risk of prosecution
under any part of the terrorism legislation, once it goes live.
According to the 2006 Terrorism Act, a person commits an offense if he distributes a “ter-
rorist publication” with the aim of directly or indirectly encouraging “the commission, prep-
aration or instigation of acts of terrorism.”55 He also commits an offense if he is reckless as
to whether his conduct [i.e., distributing a “terrorist publication”] has an effect of encourag-
ing the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism.56 This is Henley:
The relevant section is section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, “Dissemination of terrorist publica-
tions.” Section 2 (1)(a) & (b) deal with offences committed with the speciﬁc intent of encourag-
ing acts of terrorism, but section 2(1)(c) makes it an offence if the individual disseminating the
terrorist publication “is reckless as to whether his conduct has [such] an effect.” The deﬁnition
of a terrorist publication is drawn widely but includes “any matter which gloriﬁes the commis-
sion or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of [terrorist] acts” (s2(4)
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(a)). There is little room for doubt that the second [“For the Sake of Allah”] and fourth
[“Although the Disbelievers Dislike it”] ﬁlms fall within this deﬁnition, and uploading them
would satisfy the deﬁnition of the relevant conduct set out exhaustively at subsection (2)(a).
“However,” Henley continued:
it is a defence if the person (i.e. Dr Cottee) can show “that the matter by reference to which the
publication in question was a terrorist publication neither expressed his views nor had his
endorsement” (section 2(9)(a)), and “that it was clear, in all the circumstances of the conduct,
that the matter did not express his views and did not have his endorsement” (section 2(9)(b)).
This defence would in my view provide legal protection to Dr Cottee. This is an academic
research project and there is no sensible basis to suggest that any of the ISIS videos reﬂect Dr
Cottee’s views. They obviously do not. This is an objective study designed better to understand
ISIS propaganda and what exactly are the features which are most compellingly persuasive.
Henley further clariﬁed:
If the statutory defence set out at s2(9)(a)&(b) applies, which Dr Cottee could rely upon in the
ﬁrst instance, an offence will still be committed if a police constable gives notice to remove the
offending material within two working days and there is a failure to comply with the notice. If
there is a failure to comply with the notice within two working days then “the statement, or the
article or record to which the conduct relates is to be regarded as having the endorsement of a
person” (i.e. Dr Cottee) (s3(2)), and the defence is no longer available.
About a month after submitting our application to the REAG, along with Mr. Henley’s
report, we were notiﬁed that our application was put on hold, pending clariﬁcation on how
we would mitigate against the risk that a person below the age of 18 might view the ISIS
video material included in the survey. Although the survey could only be activated by click-
ing on a bar that said, “YES, I’M OVER 18,”57 the chair of the REAG was not satisﬁed that
this was adequate enough mitigation. After discussing this issue further with both the chair
and our head of school we were told that the survey could only go ahead on the condition
that we were to limit its dissemination to university students—a population we could reason-
ably expect to be 18 and over. Two further conditions were imposed: (1) that we refrain from
advertising the survey on social media and (2) that we ensure that the survey’s Web address
could not be picked up by Internet search engines.
We accepted both conditions, and then immediately began work on circulating the sur-
vey, ﬁrst to hundreds of undergraduate students from all degree programs at our university.
Some of these students in turn circulated the survey’s Web address on social media, although
we have no way of knowing how many further respondents were gathered via this route. We
advertised the survey on several adult-restricted online gaming sites, and on several adult-
restricted Reddit sub-forums.58 We also enlisted the help of scores of colleagues in the
United Kingdom and the United States, requesting that they advertise the survey to their
own students, using a standard invitation that we had prepared. Some colleagues, mainly
criminologists and sociologists, were enthusiastic about the survey and offered to circulate
the invitation and survey Web address to their students or among the wider student-body in
their respective departments; some used the survey in their own classes on terrorism and
ISIS. Others were rather less enthusiastic, explaining that they would need to submit an
ethics application to their own university Institutional Review Board before they could
advertise the survey to their students. Quite a few colleagues did not get back to us. And
8 S. COTTEE AND J. CUNLIFFE
some pointedly declined to assist. For example, one academic, a professor in computing,
expressed his concerns like this:
I understand your research, and appreciate it but. … Well I decided I had to view it and take
part before I sent it on to my students. To be honest, I have to say that the ISIS videos are far
more compelling than the counter-message, and that makes me feel very uncomfortable.
The ISIS message is community, togetherness, acceptance, outward looking, socially cohesive.
The US counter-message is individualistic, inward looking and socially one-off. It also makes a
lot of use of females—who don’t carry the same evidential weight in Islamic culture (in fact 50%
evidential weight, at best).
My students, including several with an ILP [Inclusive Learning Plan], do not always exhibit the
best judgement, and some even have difﬁculty in separating fact from reality. Some are loners
who are lacking community and many are quite vulnerable. If I sent this to 100 students, I feel
that there is a very strong risk that some proportion of them will be swayed by the message.
Basically I am concerned that I would be doing ISIS’s job for them.
Sorry to sound negative—because I know your research is valuable—but in good conscience I
cannot circulate it to my students. I hope you can understand that.59
Another colleague, a professor of criminology and a head of a university department, said,
somewhat evasively: “We have had a look at the survey and we are concerned about some of
the videos in the survey and how these would be received by our students. We are not happy
to circulate the survey to our students, unfortunately.”60 One colleague reported to us that
she had been reprimanded by another colleague for circulating the survey, who told her that
it contravened U.K. terrorism law. And one student similarly reported to us that she had
been asked to remove the survey advertisement and Web address from a Facebook group
she belonged to.
Despite the restrictions and sensitivities surrounding it, the ISAR survey picked up
respondents quickly in the ﬁrst few weeks of going live, and after just three months it had
generated over 2,000 responses. This surprised us, given the difﬁculties we encountered in
circulating the survey and that respondents were not paid. What also struck us was how few
responses there were from Muslims. In an effort to rectify this we contacted various Muslim
organizations to see if they would be willing to advertise the survey to their members. We
sent e-mails to the administrators at Ummah.com (a popular website for Muslims based in
the United Kingdom) to see if they might be willing to help. They did not respond to our
requests. We reached out to the Salam Project, based in West London and Moss Side, Man-
chester,61 who told us that it was highly unlikely that their members would do the online
survey, due to concerns over accessing ISIS videos from their personal electronic devices and
how this would look if they were forced to hand these over to the police. We also contacted
the Active Change Foundation, based in Walthamstow, East London, which was extremely
supportive of our research and advertised it to their members, generating over 200 survey
completions. Still, the total number of Muslims in our survey sample is very small, as can be
seen below.
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Results and Discussion
In the six-month period for which it remained online, the survey generated approximately 3,000
responses. About half of all respondents were in full-time education. Of the respondents, 1,290
were from North America, and 1,011 were from the United Kingdom; around 431 were from
Europe. Their mean age was 30, with a big clump—1,442—between 18 and 26. Sixty-four per-
cent were male, with 5 percent either not stating their gender or choosing “Other.” Thirty-six
percent identiﬁed as having no religion; 17 percent identiﬁed as Christian; and 4 percent (135
respondents) identiﬁed as Muslim. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of respondents—93 per-
cent—reported a negative attitude toward ISIS. Only 34 people (just over 1 percent) reported a
positive view of the group, with a further 177 (6 percent) reporting a neutral view. Of the 34
who reported a positive attitude toward ISIS, ﬁve were Muslims, and although this group—135
in total—had a higher inclination to report a positive or neutral opinion of ISIS (13 percent
compared to 7 percent of non-Muslims) the vast majority—113 (87 percent)—professed a nega-
tive opinion of the group. Fifty-seven percent said they had watched an ISIS video before,
beyond clips shown on TV and in online news material. Of this number, 46 percent said they
had actively searched for it online, while 38 percent said they had stumbled across it by acci-
dent; 8 percent indicated they had accessed the video through a Web link that someone else
had sent them. Of the 57 percent who said they had watched ISIS video-material, 46 percent—
that is, 759 survey respondents—reported they had seen more than ten ISIS videos. This may
well say more about the quirks of the survey sample than about young adults’ exposure to
ISIS—or it may not. It is hard to know, although the ease with which ISIS videos can still be
viewed on the Internet, despite the recent pushback from social media companies,62 is quite
remarkable.63 These ﬁgures are presented in Table 1.
Production Values
In the main, respondents were generally impressed by the technical quality of all the ISIS
video clips (Table 2). Forty-three percent positively rated the production values of video 1
(“The Clanging of the Swords part 4”), although 52 percent were negative about the acapella
singing over it. Video 2 (“For the Sake of Allah”) scored even higher, with 60 percent
expressing a positive view about production values, although 75 percent did not like the
Deso Dogg nasheed on which the video was based. Respondents were even more impressed
by the production values of video 3 (“Eid Greetings from the Land Of Khilafah”), with 74
percent expressing a positive view, although 56 percent did not like the nasheed64 in the clip.
But by far the most positively rated ISIS video in terms of production values was video 4
(“Although the Disbelievers Dislike it”), with 80 percent of respondents expressing a favor-
able view, despite the disturbing subject-matter of the video.
The most striking ﬁndings of the survey relate to videos 3 and 4, both of which deal with
two central themes in ISIS’s self-presentation to the world: namely, the promise of a paradise
on Earth for Muslims (with bountiful markets, pristine hospitals and parks, and righteous
justice) and the use of ultra-violence in making good on that utopian promise.
Utopia
Video 3 (“Eid Greetings from the Land Of Khilafah”) shows a handsome, strong-looking
adult male member of ISIS (a leather bullet-belt hangs from his shoulders) handing out toys
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Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of the sample.
Characteristic Categories and frequencies
Region U.S. Canada U.K. Europe Other/unspeciﬁed
n 1,024 266 1,011 431 372
% of valid 33.0% 8.6% 32.6% 13.9% 12.0%
Religion No religion Muslim Christian Other religion No answer
n 1,125 135 536 123 1,185
% of valid 36.2% 4.3% 17.3% 4.0% 38.2%
Attitude toward ISIS Positive Neutral Negative
n 34 177 2,689
% of valid 1.2% 6.1% 92.7%
Attitude toward ISIS and religion Positive Neutral Negative
Identify as Muslim
n 5 12 113
% of valid 3.8% 9.2% 86.9%
Do not identify as Muslim
n 29 165 2,576
% of valid 1.0% 6.0% 93.0%
Have you seen an ISIS video before? No I can’t remember Yes
n 1,113 120 1,659
% of valid 38.5% 4.1% 57.4%
How many ISIS videos have you seen? One or two Three or four Five to ten More than ten
n 383 316 197 759

























Table 1. (Continued )
Characteristic Categories and frequencies
Region U.S. Canada U.K. Europe Other/unspeciﬁed
% of valid 23.1% 19.1% 11.9% 45.9%
How they came to watch the video Search for speciﬁcally Stumbled across it Sent via e-mail Sent via link Couldn’t remember
n 764 629 19 140 123



















to a group of boys and girls. At one point, he picks up a particularly young girl and affection-
ately kisses her on the cheek. Sixty-seven percent concurred with the statement that “the
children look happy and well cared for.” Sixty-one percent concurred with the statement
that “there’s a strong sense of community spirit here.”
Regarding the ISIS militant, around one third of respondents expressed positive judg-
ments about his physical strength and moral character: Thirty-seven percent agreed that he
looked “strong,” while 28 percent agreed that he looked like a “decent man.” And a not insig-
niﬁcant number—28 percent—said the video gave them a “warm feeling,” and this percent-
age only drops to 26 percent when restricted to those who proclaim to feel negatively about
ISIS.
Asked if they thought the scenario in the video looked “made up,” 67 percent of respond-
ents expressed agreement. Yet a fairly sizeable 33 percent were either not sure or did not
think that it looked made up (Table 3).
Ultra-Violence
Video 4 (“Although the Disbelievers Dislike it”) shows a group of ISIS ﬁghters marching
captured members of the Syrian Army, described as “Nusayri ofﬁcers and pilots,”65 to an
execution line-up, where they are forced to their knees. The camera lingers on their cleanly
shaven faces,66 and then focuses tightly on the hands of one of the executioners as he slowly
caresses his knife. Then “Jihadi John” (Kuwaiti-born British citizen Mohammed Emwazi)
Table 2. Reception of production values and nasheeds, all videos.
Production values, music and reception of ISIS videos
How would you rate the production of: Very good Good Average Poor Very poor
Video 1 n 309 806 822 461 209
% of valid 11.9% 30.9% 31.5% 17.7% 8.0%
Video 2 n 481 938 627 221 105
% of valid 20.3% 39.5% 26.4% 9.3% 4.4%
Video 3 n 669 913 443 68 37
% of valid 31.4% 42.9% 20.8% 3.2% 1.7%
Video 4 n 691 791 285 45 42
% of valid 37.3% 42.7% 15.4% 2.4% 2.3%
Consider the music—do you like it? Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
In video 1 n 128 425 669 575 756
% of valid 5.0% 16.6% 26.2% 22.5% 29.6%
In video 2 n 63 180 327 501 1245
% of valid 2.7% 7.8% 14.1% 21.6% 53.8%
In video 3 n 96 299 504 557 587
% of valid 4.7% 14.6% 24.7% 27.3% 28.7%
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Table 3. Reaction to “Eid Greetings from the Land Of Khilafah” (video 3).
Utopia (Video 3)
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
When considering the scene:
The children look happy and well cared for n 260 1143 392 195 90
% of valid 12.5% 55.0% 18.8% 9.4% 4.3%
There is a strong sense of community spirit here n 294 967 424 249 141
% of valid 14.2% 46.6% 20.4% 12.0% 6.8%
The scene looks made up n 745 650 386 254 37
% of valid 36.0% 31.4% 18.6% 12.3% 1.8%
Consider the bearded man:
I like his look n 44 216 640 572 584
% of valid 2.1% 10.5% 31.1% 27.8% 28.4%
He looks strong n 87 677 632 373 285
% of valid 4.2% 33.0% 30.8% 18.2% 13.9%
He looks like a decent man n 69 509 680 365 425
% of valid 3.4% 24.9% 33.2% 17.8% 20.8%
How much do you agree or disagree?
It gives me a warm feeling n 108 484 450 533 537
% of valid 5.1% 22.9% 21.3% 25.2% 25.4%
Table 4. Reaction to “Although the Disbelievers Dislike it” (video 4).
Ultra-violence (Video 4)
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
How does the video make you feel,
It scares me n 605 469 310 271 206
% of valid 32.5 25.2 16.7 14.6 11.1
It makes me feel uncomfortable n 958 464 225 132 80
% of valid 51.5 25.0 12.1 7.1 4.3
It makes me feel sick n 755 484 265 236 113
% of valid 40.7 26.1 14.3 12.7 6.1
It bores me n 75 125 449 664 540
% of valid 4.0 6.7 24.2 35.8 29.1
No I do and I don’t Yes
Would you like to see more of this video n 825 438 613
% of valid 44.0 23.3 32.7
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Table 6a. Differences between males and females in relation to “Although the Disbelievers Dislike it”
(video 4).
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree n
It makes me feel good (video 4)
Female 1.1% 0.3% 1.0% 8.2% 89.4% 613
Male 1.6% 1.7% 6.7% 15.0% 75.0% 1,238
It bores me (video 4)
Female 1.8% 3.8% 21.9% 36.1% 36.4% 607
Male 5.1% 8.2% 25.5% 35.6% 25.5% 1,229
It makes me feel uncomfortable (video 4)
Female 71.8% 18.2% 5.6% 2.0% 2.5% 609
Male 41.8% 28.2% 15.2% 9.6% 5.2% 1,233
It scares me (video 4)
Female 55.6% 25.2% 11.3% 5.2% 2.6% 611
Male 21.3% 25.2% 19.1% 19.0% 15.3% 1,233
It makes me feel sick (video 4)
Female 61.9% 24.9% 6.9% 5.1% 1.2% 606
Male 30.7% 26.8% 17.8% 16.3% 8.5% 1,230
Table 5. Reaction to U.S. countermessage (video 5).
U.S. Countermessage (Video 5)
Very good Good Average Poor Very poor
How would you rate the production
quality of this video
n % of 339 645 644 218 69
valid 17.7 33.7 33.6 11.4 3.6
How do you understand the video, Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
It’s saying ISIS is really bad n % of 930 837 110 28 9
valid 48.6 43.7 5.7 1.5 0.5
No Not so sure Yes
Do you think the video is truthful? n % of 125 511 1294
valid 6.5 26.5 67.0
No Can’t remember Yes
Have you watched any other U.S. State
Department counter-messaging
videos?
n % of 1523 177 227
valid 79.0 9.2 11.8
one or two three or four ﬁve to ten More than ten
How many U.S. counter-messaging
videos have you watched?
n % of 102 67 27 31
valid 45 30 12 14
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Table 6b. Whether males and females want to see more of “Although the Disbelievers Dislike it” (Video 4).
No I do and I don’t Yes n
Would you like to see more of This video (video 4)
Female 54.1 30.3 15.6 614
Male 39.4 19.6 41.0 1243
Table 7. Differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in relation to “Eid Greetings from the Land
Of Khilafah” (video 3).
Strong agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree n
It gives me a warm feeling (video 3)
Muslim 19.7% 28.8% 23.5% 15.9% 12.1% 132
Non-Muslim 4.1% 22.5% 21.2% 25.9% 26.3% 1,980
When considering the scene, the children look happy and well cared for (video 3)
Muslim 22.7% 54.5% 16.7% 2.3% 3.8% 132
Non-Muslim 11.8% 55.0% 19.0% 9.9% 4.4% 1,948
When considering the scene, there is a strong sense of community spirit here (video 3)
Muslim 24.0% 51.2% 12.4% 6.2% 6.2% 129
Non-Muslim 13.5% 46.3% 21.0% 12.4% 6.8% 1,946
When considering the scene, the scene looks made up (video 3)
Muslim 19.8% 21.4% 28.2% 25.2% 5.3% 131
Non-Muslim 37.0% 32.0% 18.0% 11.4% 1.5% 1,941
Consider the bearded man, I like his look (video 3)
Muslim 6.4% 21.6% 36.8% 20.8% 14.4% 125
Non-Muslim 1.9% 9.8% 30.8% 28.3% 29.3% 1,931
Consider the bearded man, he looks strong (video 3)
Muslim 7.9% 38.6% 30.7% 15.7% 7.1% 127
Non-Muslim 4.0% 32.6% 30.8% 18.3% 14.3% 1,927
Consider the bearded man, he looks like a decent man (video 3)
Muslim 8.5% 33.3% 32.6% 16.3% 9.3% 129
Non-Muslim 3.0% 24.3% 33.2% 17.9% 21.5% 1,919
Consider the music in this scene, I like it (video 3)
Muslim 11.0% 27.6% 30.7% 17.3% 13.4% 127
Non-Muslim 4.3% 13.8% 24.3% 27.9% 29.7% 1,916
Consider the black and white ﬂag, it looks cool (video 3)
Muslim 7.7% 17.7% 32.3% 21.5% 20.8% 130
Non-Muslim 1.9% 9.8% 19.9% 30.3% 38.0% 1,911
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talks to the camera: “To Obama, the dog of Rome, today we are slaughtering the soldiers of
Bashar and tomorrow we’ll be slaughtering your soldiers. With Allah’s permission we will
break this ﬁnal and last crusade and the Islamic State will soon like your puppet David
Cameron said begin to slaughter your people on your streets.” The clip ends just before the
executioners start sawing, simultaneously, into the necks of their captives.
On viewing this clip, 58 percent said the video scared them, while 26 percent reported that it
did not, with 17 percent expressing no particular view either way (Table 4). Signiﬁcantly more—
76 percent—said it made them feel uncomfortable, while 67 percent said it made them feel sick.
Only 11 percent said the video bored them, suggesting that, for the majority of respondents,
while staged beheadings may be uncomfortable, scary, and sickening to watch, they nevertheless
make for compelling viewing. Indeed, when asked if they wanted to view the video to its grisly
completion, 33 percent said yes, with 23 percent reporting feelings of ambivalence about wanting
to see this. Less than half—44 percent—said they did not want to see the video to the end.
Research on horror ﬁlms shows that for all the disgust that scenes of graphic violence
elicit, audiences are drawn to watch them because of the stimulation and curiosity they
arouse.67 Is this true of ISIS execution videos? Perhaps it is, and there is certainly sugges-
tive anecdotal evidence pointing to a keen interest in ISIS beheading videos in the English-
speaking world. According to Frances Larson, an estimated 1.2 million people in Britain
had watched the beheading video of James Foley in the days immediately after its release.68
It is difﬁcult to know just how reliable this estimate is, but it is clear that large numbers of
people were actively interested in it,69 and it is also clear from our ﬁndings that given the
chance to view an ISIS staged atrocity, many people will willingly take it. However, what is
not clear is just how much of ISIS’s brand of ultra, High Deﬁnition violence they are pre-
pared to expose themselves to. Would the one third of those who said they wanted to con-
tinue watching have turned away at the ﬁrst spurt of blood, or would they have watched,
transﬁxed, right up until the end? It is certainly not something we were able to test in our
survey, given the ethical constraints to which it was subject.70
The Countermessage
The ﬁnal video clip in the survey is a 2-minute-long U.S. State Department “countermes-

















Figure 1. Videos 3 and 5 authenticity reception, by religion.
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 17
of those who have left ISIS. Speaking from their own personal experiences, the interviewees
describe how brutal and corrupt ISIS rule was, with routine public executions, horriﬁc abuse
of women and children, and a lack of food and sanitation.
In the Western media, the U.S. State Department’s anti-ISIS videos have been widely
derided for their amateurish and low-budget production quality.71 Surprisingly, then, 51 per-
cent positively rated the production quality of the video, despite it being a “mash-up” of preex-
isting footage. Thirty-four percent thought it was average. Only 11 percent rated it as poor,
with 4 percent rating it as very poor. Interestingly, in terms of production quality, respondents
were far more positive about this video than the ﬁrst ISIS video in the survey, which David
Carr had praised for its “remarkable drone camera work.”72
The intended message in the video is that life under ISIS is a horror show that could not
be further from the Islamic utopia the group claims to have established in its territories in
Syria and Iraq. Ninety-two percent understood the message in this way. Only 2 percent failed
to understand the intended message of the video. Strikingly, 67 percent agreed that the video
was truthful; 6 percent dissented from this view, while 26 percent neither agreed nor dis-
agreed with the statement that the video was truthful. Rather more predictably, 79 percent
had never seen a U.S. State Department countermessaging video before, and of the 12 per-
cent who had, 45 percent had seen just one or two. This stands in marked contrast to
respondents’ exposure to ISIS videos (recall that 57 percent had watched an ISIS video
before, and of this number 46 percent had seen more than ten). This discrepancy may be for
two reasons: ﬁrst, because ISIS-produced content dwarfs that of the U.S. State Department;
and, second, because U.S. countermessaging videos, unlike those of ISIS, have generated little
sustained coverage in the Western media.73
Ultra-Violence, Utopia, and Trust
Audience reception research on violent ﬁlms suggests that women are less open to scenes of
violence and gore than men,74 and opinion-poll data shows that large numbers of Muslims are
distrustful of U.S. foreign policy.75 We were curious to ﬁnd out if our survey data supported
these two established research ﬁndings. We were also curious to probe if Muslim respondents,
given their faith background and communal identity, would be more receptive to the utopia
theme in video 3 (“Eid Greetings from the Land Of Khilafah”) than non-Muslim respondents.
Female respondents, we found, were far more likely to report negative emotional responses
to the mass beheading video than male respondents, with 90 percent reporting that the video
made them “feel uncomfortable,” compared to 70 percent of men, 81 percent reporting that it
made them “feel scared,” compared to 46 percent of men, and 87 percent reporting that it
made them “feel sick,” compared to 58 percent of men (Table 6a). Only 16 percent of female
respondents professed a wish to continue watching the video to its bloody climax, whereas 41
percent of male respondents said they wanted to continue watching (Table 6b).
One way of interpreting this is to say that men and women respondents were equally put
off by the mass beheading video, and that the discrepancy between the two can be explained
by the gendered expectation that men should not show, or testify to, feelings of discomfort,
fear, and disgust.
But it’s also possible that the discrepancy we found may actually reﬂect a real discrepancy
between men’s and women’s tolerance for watching gore and violence. And there is a great
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deal of evidence from media researchers to show that this discrepancy is real: that men, on
the whole, especially young men, are far more enthused by gore and horror than women.
Our data seem to support this.
Despite the small sample size, we also found marked differences between how Mus-
lim and non-Muslim respondents responded to video 3 (“Eid Greetings from the Land
of Khilafah”) (Table 7). Almost 50 percent (49 percent) of Muslim respondents said
the video gave them a “warm feeling,” compared to 27 percent of non-Muslim respond-
ents. Asked whether they liked “the look” of the ISIS ﬁghter, 28 percent of Muslim
respondents said yes, compared to 12 percent of others; asked whether they thought
the ISIS ﬁghter looked like a “decent man,” 42 percent of Muslim respondents versus
27 percent said yes; asked whether they thought the ISIS ﬂag in the video “looks cool,”
the ratio was 26 percent to 12 percent; and asked whether they liked the music in the
scene, almost 40 percent (39 percent) of Muslim respondents said they did, compared
to 18 percent of non-Muslims. In fact, on the likability of ISIS nasheeds, we found that
Muslim respondents were far more inclined to like than non-Muslim respondents, with
82 percent either positive or neutral about at least one of the three nasheeds in the sur-
vey, compared to 45 percent for non-Muslim respondents. It is not clear what explains
these discrepancies, although it may be conjectured that the “warmth” many Muslim
respondents felt at viewing the scene owed something to their religious identiﬁcation
with the participants depicted in the clip.
A yet further difference between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents was exhibited in
responses to the believability of the “Eid Greetings” video clip. Asked whether they thought the
scene in the clip looks “made up,” 41 percent of Muslim respondents said yes, compared to
nearly 70 percent (69 percent) of non-Muslim respondents. In fact, 30 percent of Muslim
respondents thought the scene did not look made up, compared to just 13 percent of non-Mus-
lim respondents.
These ﬁndings are almost exactly reversed in respect to the U.S. State Department “counter-
message” video, with 47 percent of Muslim respondents saying they thought the video was
“truthful,” compared to nearly 70 percent (69 percent) of non-Muslim respondents. And
whereas 42 percent of Muslim respondents were on the fence about whether the video was
truthful or not, for non-Muslim respondents that ﬁgure was much lower: 26 percent. Twelve
percent of Muslim respondents did not think the video was truthful, compared to 6 percent of
non-Muslim respondents (Figure 1). This seems to be consistent with polling data on worldwide
Muslim attitudes toward the United States, and suggests that any countermessage that bears the
seal of the U.S. State Department will be rendered partially ineffective by that symbolic associa-
tion. However, it is important to add that with only 135 Muslims in the survey sample whatever
differences the data show in relation to this group must be treated with great caution.
Conclusion
Our investigation into audience responses to ISIS videos was beset by acute ethical, legal, and
practical problems. We were unable, due to political sensitivities, to assemble an adequate,
much less representative, sample of young Muslim adults. Indeed, we were unable, due to the
restriction imposed on the investigation by our university REAG, to assemble anything remotely
like a representative sample of British and American young adults tout court. And were it not
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for the goodwill and nerve of some academic colleagues, as well as the solid support of the
Active Change Foundation in London, we would not have been able to assemble a sample at
all. Our investigation is also subject to all the many limitations that quantitative survey research
is necessarily subject, as well as to all the well-known drawbacks of online survey research.
Because of the non-representative nature of our sample, our results cannot be used to
make generalizations about young people’s engagement with ISIS videos. Still less can they
be used to shed a direct light on the question of the role (if any) of JOP in the radicalization
of jihadists. But they are not irrelevant to that last question, for at least two reasons. First,
what our results show is there is a morbid buzz associated with ISIS atrocity videos, and that
for all the disgust, discomfort, and fear they evoke, something makes us—or many of us, at
least—want to look at them. If, as some scholars suggest, exposure to JOP can “trigger” or
“catalyze” the radicalization process for some people, the desire among so many of our sur-
vey respondents to want to watch ISIS atrocity videos should be a matter for concern.
A second area of concern that our results speak to is the seeming palatability of
ISIS’s nonviolent videos, and how the themes of community and righteousness they
trade on are received positively among a not insigniﬁcant number of those who profess
no sympathy for the group. Were these videos not so palatable, both in terms of pro-
duction values and message-content, fewer people would want to watch them, or carry
on watching them.
Given the immense challenges involved in doing research on audiences of JOP it is
unclear where future research in this area is headed. In the United Kingdom, at least, the pic-
ture looks decidedly bleak, given plans by the current government to make it a criminal
offense to repeatedly view “terrorist online content.”76 It is one thing for researchers to run
the risk of arrest for disseminating that content, as we did, but it is quite another to expect
respondents to run it as well. But outside of the United Kingdom and the United States, in
countries where terrorism legislation is less draconian, and where ethics boards are less risk-
averse, the opportunities look brighter, and one particularly promising area of research
would be to explore the so-called crime–terror nexus77 by conducting audience-reception
research on JOP in prisons, with a control group outside of them.
The broader question of how exposure to JOP features in the radicalization of jihadists is
not answered in our research, and it may, in fact, be unanswerable, given how difﬁcult it is
to disentangle the multiple causal threads in the process by which someone becomes radical-
ized. And while there is evidence to suggest that jihadists often consume and disseminate a
range of jihadist online material, there is no hard evidence to suggest that they were radical-
ized by that material.
However, there is still much that can be learned about the role and affective impact of
JOP, and a good place to start is by researching those on the receiving end of it. Though the
challenges of working in this research area are immense, they are not insurmountable, and
far more research needs to be done on this important and neglected area of inquiry.
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